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Home Office Deductions
Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980).
L INTRODUCTION
Income tax deductions for expenses associated with an office in
the taxpayer's personal residence have been the subject of sub-
stantial controversy since the early 1960s. Prior to 1976, home of-
fice expenses were deducted under the same sections of the
Internal Revenue Code (Code) as other business expenses.' The
courts and the Internal Revenue Service (Service) often disagreed
over the proper interpretation to be given these Code sections with
respect to deductions for home office expenses.2 Currently, sec-
tion 280A of the Code governs deductions associated with offices in
the home.3
The Tax Court recently interpreted section 280A in a series of
cases. 4 In Curphey v. Commissioners the court took a liberal
stance in interpreting section 280A,6 and held that a taxpayer em-
ployed outside the home could have more than one principal place
1. See ILR.C. §§ 162, 167; notes 12-13 & accompanying text infra.
2. See Section Il of the text infra.
3. Section 280A of the Internal Revenue Code was added to the Code by the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 to deal specifically with the office-in-the-home deduction.
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
4. The Tax Court had its first opportunity to interpret section 280A of the Code
in Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980). Since that time, four other
cases have been decided. Chauls v. Commissioner, T.C.AM. (P-H) 80,471
(1980); Borom v. Commissioner, T.C.AM. (P-H) 80,459 (1980); Hynes v. Com-
missioner, 74 T.C. 93 (Sept. 1980); Baie v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 105 (Apr.
1980).
5. 73 T.C. 766 (1980).
6. Section 208A of the Internal Revenue Code, in pertinent part, provides:
Sec. 280A. DISALLOWANCE OF CERTAIN EXPENSES IN CON-
NECTION WITH BUSINESS USE OF HOME ....
(a) GENERAL RULE.- Except as otherwise provided in this
section, in the case of a taxpayer who is an individual or an electing
small business corporation, no deduction otherwise allowable under
this chapter shall be allowed with respect to the use of a dwelling
unit which is used by the taxpayer during the taxable year as a resi-
dence.
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of business, thereby allowing a deduction for home office expenses
associated with the management of rental property.7 However, the
Service had conceded that the taxpayer's activities concerning the
business of renting property were conducted from the office in the
taxpayer's home. The Tax Court, therefore, was not called upon to
decide whether the home office or the rental properties themselves
constituted the taxpayer's principal place of business.8 In many
cases this will be the central issue.9
On August 10, 1980 the Service issued proposed regulations for
section 280A.1o These proposed regulations conflict with the
(c) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN BUSINESS OR RENTAL
USE; LIMITATIONS ON DEDUCTION FOR SUCH USE.-
(1) Certain business use.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to
any item to the extent such item is allocable to a portion of the dwell-
ing unit which is exclusively used on a regular basis-
(A) as the taxpayer's principal place of business,
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, cli-
ents, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the
normal course of his trade or business, or
(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not at-
tached to the dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer's
trade or business.
In the case of an employee the preceding sentence shall apply only if
the exclusive use referred to in the preceding sentence is for the con-
venience of his employer.
LR.C. § 280A.
7. 73 T.C. at 776.
8. Id. at n. 11.
9. See Section IV of the text infra.
10. The proposed regulations for section 280A in pertinent part, provide:
Use as the taxpayer's principal place of business-(1) In general.
Section 280A(c) (1) (A) provides an exception to the general rule of
section 280A(a) for any item to the extent the item is allocable to a
portion of the dwelling unit which is used exclusively and on a regu-
lar basis as the taxpayer's principal place of business. (2) Determi-
nation of principal place of business. For purposes of section
280A(c) (1) (A) and this section, a taxpayer may have only one princi-
pal place of business regardless of the number of business activities
in which the taxpayer may be engaged. When a taxpayer engages in
business activities at more than one location, it is necessary to deter-
mine the principal place of the taxpayer's overall business activity in
light of all the facts and circumstances. Among the facts and circum-
stances to be taken into account in determining an individual's prin-
cipal place of business are the following:
(i) The portion of the total income from business activities
which is attributable to activities at each location;
(ii) The amount of time spent in business activities in each loca-
tion; and
(iii) The facilities available to the taxpayer at each location.
For example, a home office in which a taxpayer engages in business
as a self-employed person would rarely qualify as the taxpayer's
principal place of business if the taxpayer's primary source of in-
come is wages for services performed in another business on the em-
ployer's premises. On the other hand, if an outside salesperson has
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Curphey holding by allowing a home office deduction only for the
principal place of business for the taxpayer's primary business."
The proposed regulation, along with the Tax Court's constrictive
view as to the actual location of the business activity, could narrow
the range of allowable deductions so that it would be virtually im-
possible for most taxpayers to qualify for the deduction even if
they had offices in their homes used regularly and exclusively in
the conduct of their businesses.
IL THE OFFICE IN THE HOME DEDUCTION
The standards used to determine the allowability of home office
deductions have not remained constant for any significant length
of time. Prior to the enactment of section 280A in 1976, deductions
for home office expenses were taken under sections 16212 and 16713
of the Code. The primary restriction on the deductions was the
Code's denial of any deductions for personal living expenses under
section 262.14 Because the courts and the Service offered various
interpretations of these sections, it became very difficult to predict
exactly where the fine line would be drawn between allowable and
nonallowable deductions.
A. Early distinctions
Some very early cases under the 1939 Code'5 focused on the dis-
tinctions the Code made between deductions taken for trade or
business expenses and deductions taken for expenses incurred in
connection with investment activities.16 The 1939 Code also distin-
guished deductions available to a self-employed person from those
allowed to an employee.'7 The cases generally focused on whether
income was ordinary income or capital gain, and only incidentally
on whether a deduction was allowable for home office expense.' 8
no office space except at home and spends a substantial amount of
time on paperwork at home, the office in the home may qualify as the
salesperson's principal place of business.
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(b) (1),(2), 45 Fed. Reg. 52399, 52403 (1980).
11. Id.
12. Section 162 of the Code allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenditures. LR.C. § 162.
13. Section 167 of the Code allows a deduction for depreciation of equipment
used in a trade or business or used to produce income. LIC. § 167.
14. LR.C. § 262. See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b) (3) (1958).
15. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 23, 53 Stat. 12.
16. See note 18 & accompanying text infra.
17. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 23, 53 Stat. 12. See note 19 & accompanying text
infra.
18. The earliest cases that tangentially addressed the home office deduction were
Higgins v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 1005 (1939), af 'd, 111 F.2d 795 (2nd Cir.
1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 212 (1941), and Rider v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1456
1981]
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However, the cases which squarely addressed the home office de-
duction issue often involved the same controversies which have
been the subject of continued litigation: 1) whether an activity
constitutes a trade or business; and 2) what standards should be
applied to an employee.19
B. The Fluctuating Controversy: 1960 to 1976
During the Sixties, the controversy over home office deductions
increased, as both the courts and the Service adopted varying in-
terpretations of what deductions were allowable under sections
162 and 167 of the 1954 Code. The courts generally allowed a de-
duction under section 16220 if the taxpayer made substantial use of
an office in the home for trade or business purposes 2 1 even without
proof of exact expenses.22
(1951). In Higgins, which involved a deduction under the Revenue Act of
1932, the primary issue was the existence of a trade or business. The tax-
payer was allowed to deduct expenses for his second office in Paris, France,
located adjacent to his residence, up to the percentage of his activities that
constituted a trade or business. 39 B.T.A. at 1015. In Rider, the court held
that a professor who had written several texts had more than one trade or
business and that the sale of his manuscripts did not constitute a sale of capi-
tal assets. Accordingly, it produced ordinary income. One factor influencing
the court's decision was the commissioner's allowance of a deduction for an
office in the home even though the professor chose to work at home for his
personal convenience. 16 T.C. at 1457, 1461.
19. Two cases which focused on these issues early in the litigation history of of.
fice-in-the-home deductions were Hand v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1410 (1951),
and Bien v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 49 (1953). In Hand, a teacher who taught
at two schools was not allowed a home office deduction because the court
deemed him to be an employee of the schools because under sections 22 and
23 of the 1939 Code, an employee was entitled to deduct only expenses for
travel, meals and lodging while away from home, and not home office ex-
penses. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, §§ 22, 23, 53 Stat. 12. The taxpayer
also did occasional accounting work out of his home but because no income
was received in the taxable year in question, no deduction was allowed.
Hand v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. at 1415.
In Bien, an architect who ran his business out of his home was allowed to
deduct the expenses of an office in the home. Bien v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.
at 56.
20. Section 162 of the Code provides a deduction for "all the ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business. . . ." LR.C. § 162(a).
21. See, e.g., Stuart v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 938 (1961), where the
court allowed a deduction for a home office because the taxpayers, husband
and wife, made substantial use of the office. The wife used it in her business
of selling real estate, and the husband, who was a C.P.A., an attorney and a
professor, frequently used the home office. Id. at 939.
22. The court would allow deductions based on proof that the expenses were in-
curred even where there was inadequate proof as to the exact amount. How-
ever, the amount of the deduction was determined in a manner weighted
against the taxpayer because of his lack of evidence. See, e.g., Hayes v. Con-
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In 1962, the Tax Court, in Davis v. Commissioner,23 held that a
professor could not deduct his home office expenses for a study
built over his garage which was used for conducting research, con-
cluding that the study was built for the personal convenience of
the taxpayer.2 4 However, a strong dissent by four justices fore-
casted the standard which was to have future importance. Writing
for the dissent, Justice Raum suggested that whether a home office
was an ordinary and necessary business expenditure deductible
under section 162 of the Code should be determined under a stan-
dard defined as whether the expenditure was "'appropriate' or
'helpful' and proximately related to the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness."2 5 His approach made no distinction on the basis of whether
the taxpayer was in the business of being an "employee." In an
attempt to buttress the majority opinion in Davis, the Service is-
sued Revenue Ruling 62-18026 which restated the Davis test. The
ruling provided that a home office deduction would be permissible
under the following circumstances:
An employee who, as a condition of his employment, is required to provide
his own space and facilities for performance of his duties and regularly
uses a portion of his personal residence for that purpose may deduct a pro
rata portion of the expenses of maintainence and depreciation on his resi-
dence. However, the voluntary, occasional, or incidental use by an em-
ployee of a part of his residence in connection with hs employment does
not entitle him to a business expense deduction ... .27
However, this ruling received a liberal construction from the
Tax Court in 1963. In Peiss v. Commissioner,2 8 a professor was al-
lowed an ordinary and necessary business expense deducton for
use of his home office for research and other professional activities
because his work space at the college was inadequate. The Service
had objected to the deduction because the taxpayer did not show
that a specific portion of the home was allotted exclusively to office
use.
2 9
Later that same year, the Service released Revenue Ruling 63-
27530 in an attempt to limit the use of the Peiss case by other tax-
payers. Under the Revenue Ruling, a professor claiming research
missioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 393 (1967); Winfield v. Commissioner, 25
T.C.M.(CCH) 305 (1966); Stuart v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 938 (1961);
Bien v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 49 (1953).
23. 38 T.C. 175 (1962).
24. Id. at 180.
25. Id. at 186 (Raum, J. dissenting; joined by Bruce, J.; Forrester, J.; and Train,
J.).
26. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52.
27. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
28. 40 T.C. 78 (1963).
29. Id at 83-84.
30. Rev. Rul. 63-275, 1963-2 C.B. 85.
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expense deductions generally would be required to show the rea-
sonableness of the research and that such research was conducted
in his area of competence. 31 The Service then issued another Rul-
ing which stated that a home office may be a reasonable expense
for a professor if it is shown that employer-furnished space is inad-
equate.3 2 These two rulings helped to maintain the "condition of
employment" requirement as established in Revenue Ruling 62-
180, as a standard for the deductibility of home office expenses. 33
However, the Tax Court gradually began to shift away from its
strict adherence to the "condition of employment" requirement.
In Bischoff v. Commissioner,34 the court announced in dictum that
the employer-imposed requirement that the taxpayer maintain an
office in his home was not necessarily a prerequisite to a deduc-
tion.35 Returning to the standard suggested by the dissent in Da-
,is, 36 the court stated that the employee's home office expenses
were deductible even if not required by the employer so long as
the expenses were "appropriate to the conduct of his trade or busi-
ness." 37 This standard, as utilized by the court in Newi v. Commis-
sioner,38 allowed a deduction for "appropriate and helpful" home
office expenses. 39 In Newi the taxpayer was a television advertis-
ing salesman who had adequate office space at the network offices,
but he used his home office for about three hours daily to review
and plan his activities, study materials, and view competitors' tele-
vision advertisements.40 The court, citing Welch v. Helvering4 ' and
Commissioner v. Tellier 42 to define ordinary and necessary busi-
31. Id. at 86.
32. See Rev. Rul. 64-272, 1964-2 C.B. 55.
33. See, e.g., Anzalone v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M.(CCH) 497, 498 (1964) (deduc-
tion disallowed when taxpayer, a sales engineer, failed to show that his em-
ployer required a home office); Kelly v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M.(CCH) 472,
478 (1964) (deduction disallowed to airline pilot who failed to show that it was
necessary for him to have a home office).
34. 25 T.C.M.(CCH) 538 (1966).
35. In Bischoff, the employer had issued a memorandum to its employees saying
that it expected them to incur some unreimbursed expenditures in connec-
tion with their jobs, which the taxpayer contended included an office at home.
Id. at 538-39.
36. See notes 23-25 & accompanying text supra.
37. 25 T.C.M. (CCH) at 539.
38. 28 T.C.M.(CCH) 686 (1969), aU'd, 432 F.2d 998 (2nd Cir. 1970).
39. Id. at 691.
40. Id.
41. 290 U.S. 111 (1933). The Supreme Court defined a necessary business expen-
diture as one which was appropriate and helpful and defined an ordinary ex-
pense as a non-capital expense, consistent with business purposes. Id. at
113-14.
42. 383 U.S. 687 (1966). The Supreme Court defined an ordinary expense as a
non-capital expense. Id. at 689-90.
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ness expenditures, made no exception for a home office expense.43
The Second Circuit, focusing on the employee's business needs,
affirmed the decision and stated that the taxpayer in Newi might
miss some of the televisibn programming he needed to view if he
had to return to the office building in the evenings; therefore, he
needed an office in his home.44
After Newi, the Tax Court made subtle distinctions as to what
constituted business reasons for the office in the home, disallowing
deductions when the office in the home seemed to be purely for
personal convenience 45 but otherwise allowing such deductions.46
In doing so, it completely ignored the Revenue Ruling 62-180 re-
quirement that the home office must be a condition of employment
in order for there to be a deduction.47
The Tax Court continued in this direction until the Fourth Cir-
cuit overturned its decision in Bodzin v. Commissioner.48 The cir-
cuit court disallowed the $100 home office deduction taken for
apartment rental expenses by an attorney who worked for the In-
ternal Revenue Service. The Tax Court had held that because "the
maintenance of the home office can be characterized as 'a matter of
convenience' due to the existence of duplicate employer-provided
facilities, [that fact] does not void the conclusion that the expendi-
ture is appropriate and helpful."4 9 The appellate court dist-
43. See 28 T.C.M. at 691.
44. 432 F.2d at 1000.
45. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M.(CCH) 837, 843 (1972) (disal-
lowed a deduction to comptroller for office in the home used purely for tax-
payer's convenience).
46. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M.(CCH) 941, 943 (1972) (allowed
a deduction to a tool salesman even though he was not required to use an
office in his home, using the same standard for an employee as used for some-
one in a trade or business); Rink v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 746, 754 (1969) (al-
lowed a deduction for a home office used for research); Thomas v.
Commissioner, 28 T.C.ML(CCH) 575, 577 (1969) (allowed a deduction for a
home office for an income tax preparer).
47. In Gillis v. Commissioner, 32T.C.M.(CCH) 429 (1973), the court allowed home
office expenses to be deducted by a district sales manager for an insurance
company even though not required by the employer because the home office
was appropriate and helpful. The court stated.
[n] either the absence of an employer requirement that a home office
be maintained nor the mere existence of duplicate facilities in and of
itself demands the disallowance of a leduction of home office ex-
penses. Rather, the test is whether, like any other business expense,
the maintenance of an office in the home is appropriate and helpful
under the circumstances or simply serves the personal convenience
of the taxpayer.
Id. at 431-32.
48. 60 T.C. 820 (1973), rev'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975).
49. 60 T.C. at 825-26 (footnotes omitted).
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inguished Newi and held that the apartment rental was a personal
expense because it was not used as a place of business. As a re-
sult, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether or not the
expenditure was appropriate or helpful.SO
During the interval between the Tax Court's decision in Bodzin
and the circuit court's reversal, the Tax Court pushed the home
office deduction to its limits by allowing a deduction to a taxpayer
who managed his own investments from the family room of his
home.5 ' However, after the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bodzin,
the Tax Court tightened up on allowability of home office deduc-
tions by using a variety of reasons for disallowing previously allow-
able deductions. In Meehan v. Commissioner,5 2 the court held that
an Office in the home was not a place of business in "terms of ei-
ther quantum or quality of activity, as contemplated by the regula-
tion."53 The regulation the court referred to was section 1.262-
l(b) (3) which disallows deductions for personal living expenses.5 4
The court also utilized a Fausner5 5 type of analysis, stating that
the taxpayer did not show any additional expense was incurred
because of his home office.
56
The Tax Court subsequently repudiated the Bodzin holding in
Sharon v. Commissioner.7 In Sharon, the taxpayer, an attorney
for the Internal Revenue Service, was not allowed to deduct ex-
penses for his home office used to review files and prepare briefs in
connection with his employment and to monitor and manage his
personal investments. 58 The court held that section 262 of the
Code,5 9 which disallowed the deduction of personal expenses,
takes precedence over section 162,60 which allows the deduction of
ordinary and necessary business expenditures. The taxpayer's in-
cidental use of the home office was not enough to establish the of-
50. 509 F.2d at 681.
51. In Anderson v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M.(CCH) 234 (1974), the Tax Court al-
lowed the deduction based on the taxpayer's involvement in a section 212
activity--the collection or production of income.
52. 66 T.C. 794 (1976).
53. Id. at 807.
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b) (3) (1958).
55. Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838, 839 (1973). In Fausner, the Supreme
Court disallowed a deduction taken by an airline pilot for his expense in
transporting his luggage to the airport in his car. The court said that no ex-
pense in addition to his normal commuting expense (which is a personal ex-
pense) was incurred by the taxpayer.
56. 66 T.C. at 808.
57. 66 T.C. 515 (1976).
58. Id. at 524-25.
59. Section 262 of the Code provides that "no deduction shall be allowed for per-
sonal, living or family expenses." LR.C. § 262.
60. See note 12 supra.
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fice as a place of business.61 The court rejected the application of
the "appropriate and helpful" test62 when a mixture of personal
and business uses existed.63
Continuing to apply a strict view, the Tax Court also disallowed
deductions to taxpayers who could not show that their homes were
better suited for their work than their offices,64 or who could not
demonstrate that their homes were their places of business, 65 or
who could not prove that any additional expense had been in-
curred.66 Occasionally, strict adherence to these rules led to some
questionable results. In Monsky v. Commissioner,67 a home office
deduction was denied to a professor who lived seven miles from
campus and who depended on public transportation to get to work.
A round trip to and from campus in the evenings would have taken
approximately 3 hours on the public transportation system. Nev-
ertheless, the court said that the professor failed to show that:
1) his home office was better suited than his campus office; 2) his
home was a place of business; or 3) additional expense at home
had been incurred.68 The court said that the taxpayer could have
chosen to live closer to campus, and then distinguished the Peiss69
case because Monsky's home office was supposedly not better
suited for work than his campus office.70
61. 66 T.C. at 524.
62. See notes 37-39 & accompanying text supra.
63. 66 T.C. at 524.
64. See, e.g., Monsky v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.(CCH) 1046 (1977) (denying a
professor a home office deduction on the grounds that his apartment was not
better suited for his work than the office space provided at school); Salviati v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C.ML(CCH) 1041, 1041-43 (1977) (disallowing a deduction
for a home office taken by a teacher because she had adequate office facilities
during the day, even though she did not have access to her schoolroom in the
evening). Cf. Shields v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.1VL(CCH) 537, 543 (1978) (al-
lowing a deduction for minister's home office used to do literary writing);
Harris v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M(CCH) 1426, 1430 (1977) (allowing a deduc-
tion for home office used more than incidentally to correlate and summarize
research).
65. See, e.g., Monsky v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.(CCH) 1046 (1977); Salviati v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.(CCH) 1041 (1977).
66. See, e.g., Salviati v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.(CCH) 1041 (1977); Cobb v. Com-
missioner, 35 T.C.M.(CCH) 1480, 1481-82 (1976) (disallowing an attorney who
worked for the Service a home office deduction because his use of the home
office was incidental (following Sharon) and because no additional expense
was incurred (following Fausner and Meehan)).
67. 36 T.C.VL(CCH) 1046 (1977).
68. Id. at 1049.
69. See note 28 & accompanying text supra.
70. 36 T.C.M.(CCH) at 1049.
19811
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C. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,71 Congress attempted to
clarify the allowable home office deduction by enacting section
280A.72 Section 280A specifically addresses home office deductions
and as a general rule, provides that "no deduction otherwise allow-
able under this chapter shall be allowed with respect to the use of
a dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer during the taxable
year as a residence. '73 This general rule does not operate to disal-
low deductions (such as interest expense and taxes) that are al-
lowable to a taxpayer without regard to the deduction's
"connection with his trade or business (or with his income-produc-
ing activity)."'74 Several exceptions to the general rule are pro-
vided in section 280A(c), including one allowing deductions if a
portion of the taxpayer's home is used exclusively and regularly as
the taxpayer's principal place of business.7 5 However, an em-
ployee is allowed a home office deduction only if the "exclusive use
referred to.... is for the convenience of the employer."7 6 Section
280A(c) (5) further limits all of the home use deductions to the
amount of gross income derived from such office use less the de-
ductions allocable to such use under the Code without regard to
the home office deduction.
77
The legislative history of section 280A indicates that Congress
recognized a need to curtail the widespread abuse of home office
deductions. 7 8 Such deductions under section 162 of the Code cre-
71. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
72. LLC. § 280A. Section 280A was added to the Code because Congress felt a
"need for definitive rules to resolve the conflict that exists between several
recent court decisions and the position of the Internal Revenue Service as to
the correct standard governing the deductibility of expenses attributable to
the maintenance of an office in the taxpayer's personal residence." S. REP.
No. 938, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 147, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3439, 3579 (hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT); H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 160, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897,
3053 (hereinafter cited as House REPORT).
73. LR.C. § 280A(a).
74. Id. § 280A(b).
75. Id. § 280A(c) (1) (A). Another exception is provided for a home office used
exclusively and on a regular basis as a place to meet with clients, patients or
customers. Id. § 280A(c) (1) (B). There are also special rules pertaining to
separate structures not attached to the dwelling, id. § 280A(c) (1) (C); storage
use, id. § 280A(c) (2); rental use, id. § 280A(c) (3); and use in providing Hi-
censed day care services, id. § 280A(c) (4).
76. Id. § 280A(c) (1).
77. Id. § 280A(c) (5).
78. Both the House and Senate reports reveal concern regarding a taxpayer be-
ing able to convert "nondeductible personal, living, and family expenses" into
deductible business expenses "simply because . . . it was appropriate and
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ated administrative problems 79 and were difficult for the Service to
monitor because they were taken by many taxpayers in all income
brackets.
Deductions for home offices used in connection with section 212
income producing activity seemingly are excluded by section 280A.
In order to qualify for a home office deduction, an activity must
reach the "trade or business" level and not be merely an invest-
ment.80 Furthermore, the provision establishes a "convenience of
the employer" test (similar to the "condition of employment" re-
quirement of Revenue Ruling 62-180)81 and thereby eliminates the
"appropriate and helpful" test.
III. THE CURPHEY DECISION
The Curphey8 2 case presented the Tax Court with its first op-
portunity to interpret the meaning of "principal place of business"
as used in section 280A. The court chose a liberal construction,
holding that a taxpayer can have more than one principal place of
business and that the test for deductibility is whether the home
office is the principal place for conducting a particular business. 83
However, the court was careful not to lay down any general rule,
stating that deductibility would depend upon the facts and circum-
stances of each case.84
A. Facts
In Curphey, the taxpayer was a fifty-two year old dermatologist
employed by a hospital in Hawaii who also owned and managed
six rental properties which were held for production of income and
for an intended source of income upon his retirement at age sixty-
helpful" to his job even though "only minor incremental expenses were in-
curred." SENATE REPORT, supra note 72, at 147; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 72,
at 160.
79. The House and Senate reports provide that "the 'appropriate and helpful' test
increases the inherent administrative problems" of determining which de-
ductions are to be allowed. SENATE REPORT, supra note 72, at 147; HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 72, at 160.
80. The Senate Finance Committee report provided.
expenses paid or incurred with respect to the use of a dwelling unit
which is used by the taxpayer both as a residence and in connection
with income producing activities (Sec. 212) will not be allowable as
deductions under the provisions of this section unless the income
producing activity constitutes a trade or business.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 72, at 149; see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 72, at
161.
81. See notes 26-27 & accompanying text supra.
82. Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980).
83. Id. at 776-77.
84. Id. at 775.
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five.85 In 1976, the taxpayer lived in a two-bedroom condominium,
using one bedroom exclusively as the office out of which he man-
aged his rental properties.86 The room contained a bookcase, desk,
filing cabinet, calculators and a "code-a-phone answering serv-
ice."87 The closet in the room contained items used to furnish, pre-
pare or repair his rental units.88 The room was not used for any
other purposes. In 1976, gross income from the rental property was
$24,760 and the net loss was $23,043 with a negative cash flow of
$6,242.89 By retirement age, the taxpayer expected to have a posi-
tive cash flow of $100 to $200 per month from each unit.9 0 On his
1976 tax return, the taxpayer deducted $549 for depreciation and
other expenses asociated with the use of his home office to manage
his real estate.9' The Service determined that the taxpayer had a
deficiency based, in part, on his deduction of the home office ex-
penses. 92 Before trial, the Service conceded that the taxpayer's
use of the home office in conjunction with the rental activity met
the "exclusive use" and "regular basis" requirements of section
280A.93 Thus, the two issues presented to the court for determina-
tion were: (1) whether the taxpayer's management of the rental
property constituted a trade or business; and (2) if so, whether the
taxpayer had more than one principal place of business or whether
the taxpayer's only principal place of business was at the hospital,
where he earned the greater portion of his income.
B. Analysis of the Decision
Relying upon substantial legislative history,94 the Tax Court
agreed with the Service's position that no deduction for home of-
fice expense would be allowable if the office was used in connec-
tion with income producing activities 95 that did not constitute a
trade or business. However, the court stated that "under appropri-
ate circumstances, such type of activity [section 212 production of
income] could constitute a trade or business." 96
85. Id. at 767-68.
86. Id. at 768.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 767.
93. Id. at 769.
94. See note 80 & accompanying text supra.
95. Section 212(2) of the Code allows deductions for all ordinary and necessary
expenses associated with the "management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income ... ." LR.C. § 212(2).
96. 73 T.C. at 771.
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The court relied on an amendment to section 280A adopted by
the Senate which incorporated section 212(2) language into the
definition of "business use of a home."9 7 Although the Conference
Committee had rejected the amendment,98 the Tax Court reasoned
that the amendment had been omitted because the Committee
viewed it either as surplusage (based on Senator Bartlett's state-
ment that the amendment specifically clarified what the joint com-
mittee intended to be included) 99 or as an extension of the
Committee intentions in automatically allowing investors in secur-
ities to qualify as a trade or business, and thereby to qualify for a
home office deduction.100 In conclusion, the court said, "We do not
read the legislative history as supporting the conclusion that Con-
gress intended to modify the long-established judicial treatment of
the ownership of rental properties as constituting a trade or busi-
ness within the meaning of Section 162."101 However, the Tax
Court qualified its holding on this issue, by stating that "[W] e are
not prepared to conclude that, in every case, the ownership and
management of such properties would, as a matter of law, consti-
tute a trade or business for such purposes."10 2 The court stated
that the issue was ultimately factual and the scope of ownership
and management activities may be important in reaching a deter-
mination.10 3 Because the taxpayer in Curphey managed his rental
property by himself, including seeking new tenants and furnish-
ing, cleaning and preparing apartments, the court concluded that
his activities were "sufficiently systematic and continuous" to es-
tablish that the taxpayer was in the business of real estate
rental. 04
Curphey indicates that although a factual determination will be
made as to the nature of the activity, a taxpayer cannot take a de-
duction for a home office used to manage or oversee investments
or other types of activities that do not constitute a trade or busi-
ness. A trap for the unwary may lie in the characterization of in-
come in similar situations. If an activity rises to the level of a trade
97. Id.. The amendment, offered on the Senate floor by Senator Bartlett, pro-
vided. "Business use of homes includes in its meaning for the use of manage-
ment, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of
income, and which is the substantial business of the taxpayer." 122 CONG.
REC. 26138 (1976).
98. ELR. CoNF. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 160, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4118, 4144; S. CoNF. REP. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 397, 455.
99. 73 T.C. at 772 (citing 122 CONG. REc. 26138 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Bartlett)).
100. 73 T.C. at 772.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 774 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 775.
104. Id.
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or business, the income generated will be ordinary income as op-
posed to capital gain treatment available to investment gains.
The second issue presented to the court was whether
Curphey's office in his home could qualify as his principal place of
business. The Service contended that if a taxpayer has more than
one trade or business, a home office is deductible only if, consider-
ing all of the taxpayer's businesses together, "his home office is his
principal place of business as determined by evaluating the time
spent, the degree of business activity, and the financial return from
the activity at each business post."105 In other words, the Service
was willing to allow a home office deduction only for the principal
place of business of the principal business of the taxpayer.106 The
Tax Court rejected this standard, stating that section 280A refers to
the home as a "specific situs in which a business is carried on."' 0 7
Although the legislative history of section 280A does not indi-
cate what meaning Congress intended to be given to the phrase
"principal place of business," the court chose to rule in favor of the
taxpayer on this issue. The test as announced by the court was
that in each case a factual determination must be made "as to
whether, with respect to a particular business conducted by a tax-
payer, the home office was his principal place for conducting that
business."' 0 8
Under this test, the Tax Court held that Curphey was entitled
to a home office deduction based upon the court's determination
that his rental property constituted a trade or business and the
Service's concession that Curphey's office in his home was his
principal place of business with respect to his rental activity.109
The court pointed out that in some situations there may be a ques-
tion as to whether the taxpayer's home or the rental property itself
would constitute the principal place of business.llo
The Tax Court's position that a taxpayer may have more than
one principal place of business for purposes of section 280A raises
an unanswered question of where the line will be drawn between
what constitutes a second trade or business and what is merely
another facet of the same trade or business. This question is im-
portant because the court will have to find a second trade or busi-
ness before most home offices can qualify for a deduction. If an
activity is only an extension of the same trade or business, the
principal place of business will almost always be located at the job
105. Id. at 776.
106. Id. at 777.
107. Id. at 776.
108. Id.
109. Id. at n. 11.
110. Id.
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site. For example, a professor with offices at both school and home
who has written several texts would have to prove that the book
writing was a separate trade or business in order to qualify for the
deduction of home office expenses. The level that an activity must
reach to be considered a trade or business for purposes of section
280A has not been specifically defined. However, cases under
other Code sections indicate that minimal activity may be all that
is required."'
However, two months after the Curphey decision, the Service
issued Private Letter Ruling 8030024 which held that a "taxpayer
can have only one principal place of business."" 2 This private let-
ter ruling involved a professor engaged in consulting who used his
home office to provide consulting services. The Service based its
position on the legislative history of section 280A, stating that
"Congress intended to severely restrict the deductibility of ex-
penses attributable to the use of an office in a residence. To allow
the taxpayer to have two principal places of business would negate
Congress' intention to restrict the deductibility of expenses."" 3
The Service also felt that the literal language of section 280A indi-
cated that a "taxpayer can have only one principal place of
business.""l4
However, a strong argument can be made that the literal lan-
guage of the section, ambiguous at best, supports the position that
a taxpayer may have more than one principal place of business.
Section 280A limits the allowable deduction for a home office to the
amount of income derived from the use of the office in the home."15
This limitation prevents abuse of the home office deduction by not
allowing the deduction to offset income in excess of the amount of
income derived from the trade or business carried on from the
home office. This seems to indicate congressional recognition that
111. Case law indicates that a taxpayer must have a profit motive, Lamont v. Com-
missioner, 339 F.2d 377, 380 (2nd Cir. 1964), which "need not be reasonable,
only genuine," Jackson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 312,316 (1972), in order to be
considered to be in a trade or business. These cases were decided on a defini-
tion of trade or business contained in Code sections 162 and 167. See I.R.C.
§§ 162, 167.
112. Priv. Ltr. Ruling 8030024 (Apr. 28, 1980).
113. Id.
114. Id. The Service said that "[tjhe exception in Section 280A(c) (1) (A) applies
specifically to the taxpayer's principal place of business, not the principal
place from which the various businesses of the taxpayer may be conducted."
Id.
115. LR.C. § 280A(c) (5). Section 280A(c) (5) provides that a deduction under sec-
tion 280A "for the taxable year by reason of being attributed to ... [a use
under § 280A(c) (1)-(4)] shall not exceed the excess of ... the gross income
derived from such use ... over the deductions allocable to such use ...
whether or not such unit (or portion thereof) was so used." Id.
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a taxpayer may have more than one trade or business and that the
deduction may be taken without regard to which trade or business
is involved so long as it is not used to offset income other than the
income derived from the use of the home office.
IV. STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING A PRINCIPAL PLACE
OF BUSINESS FOR ONE BUSINESS
After Curphey, the Tax Court was first confronted with the
problem of determining the principal place of business where only
one business was involved in Bale v. Commissioner."6 In Baie,
the court disallowed a section 280A(a) deduction for a home office
used exclusively and on a regular basis for the bookeeping opera-
tion associated with the taxpayer's operation of a hot dog stand
seven-tenths of a mile from his home. The hot dog stand measured
ten feet by ten feet, could not easily have been expanded and was
not capable of housing all the activities associated with operation
of the business." 7 The court found that the principal place of busi-
ness was the hot dog stand where the sales occurred, and not the
office in the home." 8 Thus, Bale establishes that even if the tax-
payer's home is used in connection with a trade or business, the
question remains whether the home or another location is the
principal place of business.
Two subsequent cases also have resulted in taxpayers being de-
nied a deduction. In Hynes v. Commissioner,"9 a decision ren-
dered after the issuance of the proposed regulations for section
280A,120 a television newsman was not allowed to deduct home of-
fice expenses because his principal place of business was at the
television station. The court mentioned that the taxpayer did not
demonstrate that the home office was for the convenience of the
employer. In Chauls v. Commissioner,2 1 the court disallowed a
deduction taken by a music instructor who frequently used his
home to meet the students and prepare for recitals. Although the
taxpayer presented evidence of the number of hours he had used
his home for these purposes, the court stated that the number of
hours spent on the business premises compared to the number of
hours spent working at home was not the criteria for determining
116. 74.12 TAx CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) 58 (1980).
117. Id. at 59.
118. Id. at 60. The Curphey case was not precedental for the Baie decision be-
cause the Service had conceded that the home office in Curphey was the prin-
cipal place of business. Id. at n. 6.
119. 74 T.C. 93 (Sept. 1980).
120. See note 10 supra.
121. T.C.M. (P-H) 80,471 (1980).
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which was the principal place of business. 2 The court concluded
that Congress must have meant "principal place of business" to
mean the "focal point of the taxpayer's activities."' 23 This unfortu-
nate choice of words only further confuses the definition of "princi-
pal place of business."
V. CONCLUSION
The Service's supposedly literal interpretation of section 280A
as requiring only one principal place of business seems unwar-
ranted. At best, the statutory language is ambiguous. Further-
more, the Code appears to permit more than one trade or business
by limiting home office deductions for a trade or business to the
income generated by that trade or business.
The Tax Court correctly ruled in Curphey that a taxpayer can
logically have more than one principal place of business and it is
hoped that the court will eventually find the appropriate case to
invalidate the proposed regulation, if adopted in its present form.
The court, however, has been unduly restrictive in refusing to rec-
ognize that for many businesses conducted outside of a personal
residence, the home itself may be the principal place of business.
The court should reexamine its position taken in Baie, Hynes and
Chauls to ensure that valid and legitimate business expenses in-
curred in the use of an office in the home are deductible, while
ensuring that the legislative purpose of section 280A is achieved:
preventing deductions for the use of a home for purposes which
are primarily personal. 2 4
Gay Wolesensky Crosier '82
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. SENATE REPORT, supra note 72, at 147-48; HousE REPORT, supra note 72, at 160.
